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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 HASAN MALIK DAVIS,

7 v.

Plaintiff,

8 SPARKS POLICE DEPARTMENT, *et al.*,

9 Defendants.

Case No. 3:22-cv-00311-MMD-CSD

10 ORDER

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12 *Pro se* Plaintiff Hasan Malik Davis brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C.
13 § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated
14 at the Washoe County Detention Facility. (ECF No. 1-1.) After issuing an extension of
15 time and resending various documents to Plaintiff at his current mailing address, the Court
16 ordered Davis to file his third amended complaint by February 22, 2023. (ECF Nos. 27,
17 30, 34.) The Court warned Davis that the action could be dismissed without prejudice if
18 he failed to file his third amended complaint by that deadline. (ECF No. 30 at 1-2.) That
19 deadline expired and Davis did not file a third amended complaint, move for an extension,
20 or otherwise respond.

21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the
22 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . .
23 dismissal” of a case. *Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.
24 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or
25 comply with local rules. See *Carey v. King*, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988)
26 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring *pro se* plaintiffs to keep
27 court apprised of address); *Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)
28 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to dismiss an

1 action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public's interest in
 2 expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk
 3 of prejudice to Defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their
 4 merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See *In re Phenylpropanolamine*
 5 *Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Malone*, 833 F.2d at 130).

6 The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation
 7 and the Court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Davis's
 8 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to Defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal
 9 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing
 10 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See *Anderson v. Air West*, 542
 11 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of
 12 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

13 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can
 14 be used to correct the party's failure that brought about the Court's need to consider
 15 dismissal. See *Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining
 16 that considering less drastic alternatives *before* the party has disobeyed a court order
 17 does not satisfy this factor); *accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza*, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th
 18 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that
 19 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s
 20 order as satisfying this element[,]” *i.e.*, like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled
 21 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by *Yourish*).
 22 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a
 23 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” *Henderson v. Duncan*, 779
 24 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and
 25 unless Davis files a third amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a third order
 26 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only
 27 delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. The circumstances here
 28 do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Davis needs

1 additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court's screening order. Setting
2 another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. Thus, the
3 fifth factor favors dismissal.

4 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they
5 weigh in favor of dismissal.

6 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on
7 Davis's failure to file a third amended complaint in compliance with the Court's January
8 23, 2023, order.

9 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
10 No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Davis wishes to pursue his
11 claims, he must file a complaint in a new case.

12 DATED THIS 7th Day of March 2023.

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15 MIRANDA M. DU
16 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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